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INTRODUCTION 
By all reports, the outlook for the brand-name pharmaceutical 
industry (―brand name pharma‖) in the United States is 
surprisingly bleak.
1
  Brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers 
develop innovative new drugs, but recently the pipeline for new 
 
  Associate Professor and Dean‘s Fellow, Indiana University School of Law–
Indianapolis.  Many thanks to Max Huffman, Rob Katz, Jim Kelley, Andy Klein, David 
Orentlicher, Mike Pitts, Antony Page, Florence Roisman, Carlton Waterhouse, and to the 
participants at the Second Asia-Pacific Innovation Conference at the National University 
of Singapore, and the participants at the 2d Annual Developing Ideas Conference at the 
University of Kentucky College of Law.  Special thanks to Chris Powers, Indiana 
University School of Law–Indianapolis ‗10, for his exceptional research assistance. 
 1 See, e.g., BioJobBlogger, Why Generic Drug Companies Will Dominate Future 
Pharmaceutical Markets, BIOJOBBLOG (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.biojobblog.com/20 
10/02/articles/biobusiness/why-generic-drug-companies-will-dominate-future-pharma 
ceutical-markets/; Zacks Equity Research, Pharmaceutical Stock Outlook–Sept. 2011, 
ZACKS (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.zacks.com/commentary/18914/Pharmaceutical+ 
Stock+Outlook. 
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pharmaceutical agents has been drying up.
2
  Brand-name pharma is 
expected to produce very few new drugs in the near future.
3
  
Indeed, companies like AstraZeneca have completely forgone 
some areas of drug development such as psychiatric drugs, 
focusing instead on more profitable areas such as cardiology and 
oncology.
4
  Eli Lilly, another giant in the industry, has slashed 
thousands of jobs, and consolidations and mergers among industry 
players are an increasingly common occurrence.
5
  American health 
care providers face shortages of much needed vaccines and 
medications because too few manufacturers are able to sustain a 
presence in those markets.
6
  The U.S. pharmaceutical industry was 
known until very recently, however, as one of the most robust and 
profitable in the world
7—what happened to cause this once 
flourishing industry to become one struggling to survive? 
A variety of factors account for the rather sudden downturn in 
the fortunes of pharmaceutical manufacturers, including rapidly 
rising costs, decreasing profits, and the changing nature of 
pharmaceutical research.
8
  One issue seldom addressed, however, 
is the role of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act, known informally as the Hatch-Waxman Act after 
 
 2 See BIOJOBBLOGGER, supra note 1. 
 3 Bernard Munos, Lessons from 60 Years of Pharmaceutical Innovation, 8 NATURE 
REVS. 959, 965 (2009). 
 4 See Ben Hirschler, RPT-UPDATE 1-AstraZeneca Drops Psychiatric, Other Drug 
Research, REUTERS (Mar. 2, 2010, 11:05 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010 
/03/02/astrazeneca-rd-idUSLDE62019Q20100302. 
 5 Mike Corbin, Eli Lilly Continues Layoffs Despite Profit, WISHTV8.COM (May 7, 
2010, 4:29 PM), http://www.wishtv.com/dpp/news/business/eli-lilly-continues-layoffs-
despite-profit-; Preston Henske & Tim van Biesen, Mega Mergers Can‟t Cure the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 26, 2009, 8:50 PM), 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jul2009/tc20090724_243995.htm. 
 6 Provisional Observations on Drug Product Shortages: Effects, Causes, and 
Potential Solutions, 59 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARM. 2173, 2173, 2179 (2002), available 
at http://www.ashp.org/s_ashp/docs/files/DShort_11b-SF-Witmer.pdf. 
 7 See Zacks Equity Research, Pharmaceutical Industry Outlook – March 2011, ZACKS 
(Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/48376/Pharmaceutical+Industry+ 
Outlook. 
 8 See Global Pharmaceutical R&D Productivity Declining According to Thompson 
Reuters, CMR International, THOMSON REUTERS (July 1, 2010), http://thomsonreuters 
.com/content/press_room/science/RandD-Productivity-Declines.  
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its two leading sponsors,
9
 in the current decline of brand-name 
pharma. Enacted in 1984 and amended in 2003,
10
 this statutory 
scheme roughly coincides in time with brand-name pharma‘s 
drastic change in fortune.
11
  The question is whether anything more 
than mere coincidence underlies this connection. 
The Act was designed to balance two countervailing tasks: 
facilitating greater market entry of lower-priced generic imitations 
of brand-name drugs, while at the same time preserving brand-
name pharma‘s incentives to continue discovering and developing 
new drugs.
12
  In retrospect, the Act appears to have been largely a 
success in its first goal but of questionable effect in its second.  
This Article takes a closer look at how the Hatch-Waxman Act 
may have impacted pharmaceutical innovation in the last three 
decades and, in particular, what role the Act may have played in 
the weakening of the U.S. brand-name pharma.  This critical 
overview of the Act strongly suggests that it did indeed at least 
aggravate the industry‘s downward turn and, in any event, 
certainly did little to protect the continued vitality of the industry.
13
  
We may therefore wish to reconsider the wisdom of maintaining 
the Act in its current form, or at all. 
The analysis below suggests that the Hatch-Waxman Act 
focuses far too much on competition and on removing barriers to 
market entry—and in particular, on removing barriers to entry by 
generic pharmaceuticals—as a way of decreasing pharmaceutical 
 
 9 The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
 10 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (amending the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
 11 Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of The Hatch-Waxman Scheme on 
Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 250–51 
(2005). 
 12 Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have they 
Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 389 (1998–99) (―The Drug Price Competition 
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 . . . was an unprecedented attempt to achieve 
two seemingly contradictory objectives, namely, 1) to make lower-costing generic copies 
of approved drugs more widely available and 2) to assure that there were adequate 
incentives to invest in the development of new drugs.‖). 
 13 See Matthew J. Higgins & Stuart J. H. Graham, Balancing Innovation and Access: 
Patent Challenges Tip the Scales, 326 SCIENCE 370, 370 (2009) (suggesting that Hatch-
Waxman has contributed to a decrease in the number of new drugs developed). 
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costs for consumers.  A sui generis regime that focuses solely on 
the pharmaceutical industry because of its singular regulatory 
burdens as well as its unique dependence on patents, the Act 
attempts to compensate for the fact that both regulation and patent 
protection can deter market entry.  The Hatch-Waxman Act 
therefore promotes generic market entry by relieving almost all of 
the regulatory burdens for generic manufacturers, as well as by 
helping generic manufacturers challenge the validity of brand-
name pharmaceutical patents that might be hindering such market 
entry.
14 
 Brand-name manufacturers, by contrast, enjoy no relief 
from heavy regulatory burdens.
15
  They can, however, ask for 
extensions on their pharmaceutical patent terms, as well as for 
short periods of regulatory exclusivity, as a means of offsetting 
those burdens.
16
 
The Act fails to strike the right balance between these two 
sectors of the industry.  It overshoots the mark in terms of fostering 
generic market entry while simultaneously undershooting the mark 
in terms of protecting brand-name pharma‘s incentives to develop 
new drugs.  Even after Hatch-Waxman‘s attempt to restore patent 
duration to its full-expected term, the average effective life of a 
pharmaceutical patent is still shorter than that for any other type of 
patent.
17
  It is also too short to recoup the costs of developing and 
marketing the patented drug.
18
  Furthermore, Hatch-Waxman also 
subjects pharmaceutical patents to a level of challenge that no 
other type of patent faces, shortening the average effective lives of 
these patents even further.
19
  Given the incredible costs of 
 
 14 See infra part II. 
 15 See id. 
 16 See generally infra part II; Dana P. Goldman et. al., The Benefits from Giving 
Makers of Conventional „Small Molecule‟ Drugs Exclusivity Over Clinical Trial Data, 30 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 84 (2001). 
 17 Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Assault on Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 93, 96–97 (2004). 
 18 See Goldman et al., supra note 16, at 84–85 (The National Academies Committee on 
Science, Engineering, and Public Policy is unsure that an exclusivity period of ten to 
eleven years would be an adequate period of time given complexity and drug 
development today). 
 19  Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market 
Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 491, 501 
(2007).  
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developing and marketing new drugs, not to mention the regulatory 
burdens of doing so, brand-name pharma is widely believed to 
depend on patent protection more than other industries.
20
  Hatch-
Waxman‘s effective weakening of pharmaceutical patents may 
therefore have a devastating effect on this sector of the industry. 
More importantly, by focusing almost exclusively on generic 
market entry and on brand-name patents as potential barriers to 
that entry, the Hatch-Waxman Act neglects the larger context of 
the pharmaceutical market.  As a sui generis regime, the Act was 
implemented because pharmaceutical manufacturers do not 
function within a freely competitive market.  Indeed, 
pharmaceuticals do not operate in a ―true‖ market at all, for too 
many intervening factors, including third-party payors, physicians, 
pharmacies, marketing restrictions, regulatory exclusivities, and 
government subsidies, skew the economic dynamics that would 
normally be at play in a market system.
21
  It is therefore puzzling 
that the fundamental belief running throughout the Hatch-Waxman 
Act is that, to lower the cost of drugs, the Act can now suddenly 
introduce competition into the pharmaceutical market.
22
  
Competition may be key to lowering costs in other parts of the 
health care system, and it may even be useful to a limited extent in 
lowering the cost of drugs.  In this instance, however, the story is 
much more complex than the Act‘s narrow focus on generic 
market entry would lead one to believe. 
Even assuming it was possible to address all the factors 
necessary to convert the pharmaceutical market into a potentially 
competitive one, simply focusing on generic regulatory burdens or 
 
 20 See Mark Schankerman, How Valuable Is Patent Protection? Estimates by 
Technology Field, 29 RAND J. ECON. 77, 78 (1998). 
 21 See Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey Hsieh, Introduction, in PHARMACEUTICAL 
INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 1, 2–3 (Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey Hsieh eds., 2007). 
 22 See Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug: Patent Listing 
Requirements and Application of 30-Month Stays of Approval of Abbreviated New Drug 
Applications Certifying That a Patent Claiming a Drug Is Invalid or Will Not be 
Infringed, 67 Fed. Reg. 65448, 65448 (proposed Oct. 24, 2002) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 
314) (stating that introducing pharmaceutical competition was the fundamental belief). 
See also generally Janet A. Gongola, Note, Prescriptions for Change: The Hatch-
Waxman Act and New Legislation to Increase the Availability of Generic Drugs to 
Consumers, 36 IND. L. REV. 787 (2003). 
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pharmaceutical patents would do little or nothing to foster any 
meaningful, long-term competition.  As a first matter, it is not 
patents that separate brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers 
from generic manufacturers, and it is not patents that determine 
brand-name pharmaceutical prices.  Nor is it efficiency or other 
competitive advantages that allow generic manufacturers to market 
their drugs at much lower prices than brand-name manufacturers 
do. Rather, what separates brand-name and generic manufacturers–
and the prices at which they market their respective drugs–is the 
additional goods and services that brand-name manufacturers, and 
only brand-name manufacturers, provide along with each 
pharmaceutical that they sell.
23
  These additional goods and 
services include clinical trials data, post-marketing studies, and 
even physician and patient education.
24
  They are not simply added 
value niceties; they are essential to the safety and efficacy of 
pharmaceutical agents.
25
  As such, the Hatch-Waxman Act‘s 
single-minded fixation on generic manufacturers as if they were 
direct competitors for brand-name pharma is misguided at best. 
That is not to say that the Hatch-Waxman Act has achieved no 
successes.  In the short term, for instance, the Act allowed generic 
pharmaceuticals rapidly to acquire a much greater market share 
than they ever had before and to provide less expensive versions of 
thousands of drugs that used to be available only as higher-priced 
brand-name versions.
26
  The static social welfare gains from 
greater generic entry under the Act have therefore been 
significant.
27
 
In the longer-term, by contrast, the Act has done little to help 
brand-name manufacturers and their ability to continue to develop 
new pharmaceuticals.  In fact, it has likely made their situation 
 
 23 See Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 4, 6. 
 24 See id. 
 25 See Postmarketing Clinical Trials, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBlood 
Vaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Post-MarketActivities/Phase4 
Trials/default.htm (last updated Apr. 1, 2011). 
 26 Atanu Saha et al., Generic Competition in the US Pharmaceutical Industry, 13 INT. 
J. ECON. BUS. 15, 33–35 (2001). 
 27 See generally Hughes et al., “Napsterizing” Pharmaceuticals: Access, Innovation, 
and Consumer Welfare, (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9229, 
2002), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9229.  
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worse.
28
  This in turn may decrease overall social welfare, as the 
continued development of drug therapies is thought to contribute 
greatly to social welfare.
29
  The dynamic social welfare effect of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act may therefore be quite negative.
30
  
Accordingly, we should evaluate other approaches to the problems 
facing the pharmaceutical industry, such as market or data 
exclusivities. 
The discussion proceeds as follows.  Part I provides a brief 
summary of the pharmaceutical industry, the requirements for 
regulatory approval for marketing pharmaceuticals, and how patent 
protection subsidizes the entire enterprise.  Part II then introduces 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, and Part III analyzes the effects of the Act 
within the industry, including its functional weakening of 
pharmaceutical patents.  Widening the analysis, Part IV then 
critiques the fundamental assumptions driving the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, demonstrating how it imperils continued pharmaceutical 
innovation. 
I. THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: A PRIMER 
Pharmaceuticals are one of the most cost- and time-intensive 
areas of technological innovation as well as one of the industries 
most subject to regulatory intervention.
31
  Unlike most other 
technologies, pharmaceuticals are heavily regulated by the Food 
and Drug Administration (―FDA‖) to ensure their safety and 
efficacy; indeed, the FDA regulates the manufacture and marketing 
of pharmaceuticals more strictly than it regulates food, dietary 
 
 28 See Henry Grabowski, Competition Between Generic and Branded Drugs, in 
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 153, 164–67 (Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey Hsieh eds., 
2007); see also James W. Hughes et al., supra note 27 (citing legislative history 
anticipating this effect). 
 29 See, e.g., Frank Lichtenberg, Are the Benefits of Newer Drugs Worth Their Cost? 
Evidence from the 1996 MEPS, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS 241, 241 (2001). 
 30 See generally Hughes et al., supra note 27. 
 31 See Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, Key Factors in the Rising Cost of New 
Drug Discovery and Development, 3 NATURE REVS. 417, 417 (2004). 
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supplements, or cosmetics.
32
  Identifying a compound with 
possible therapeutic benefits is only the first of many slow and 
incredibly expensive steps, and the cost of discovering, testing, and 
marketing new drugs is extremely high and continues to rise.
33
  As 
such, it is not surprising that pharmaceuticals are also widely 
recognized as one of the industries most dependent on patent 
protection to recoup its enormous research, development, 
regulatory, and post-marketing costs.
34
 
The types of pharmaceuticals most common in the last several 
decades and addressed in the Hatch-Waxman Act are largely 
small-molecule compounds, which are relatively simple chemical 
compounds that can usually be manufactured using standard 
chemistry techniques.
35
  They thus differ in many important 
respects from the new wave of so-called ―biologic‖ therapeutics, 
which are larger, more complex, and more difficult to 
manufacture.
36
  Despite their comparative simplicity, however, 
small-molecule drugs are surprisingly time-consuming to invent.  
Widely accepted descriptions of the research and development 
process establish that it takes anywhere from three to six years 
merely to identify a chemical compound as a good candidate for 
further testing.
37
  This initial screening process, usually performed 
using animal or laboratory models, is time-intensive because of the 
volume of compounds that must be screened to identify just a few 
likely candidates; for every five to ten thousand compounds 
screened, only one to five compounds are identified.
38
  With the 
 
 32 See Nina J. Crimm, A Tax Proposal to Promote Pharmacologic Research, to 
Encourage Conventional Prescription Drug Innovation and Improvement, and to Reduce 
Product Liability Claims, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1020–22  (1994). 
 33 See id. at 1033–39. 
 34 Henry Grabowski, Pharmaceuticals: Politics, Policy and Availability: Patents and 
New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries, 8 GEO. 
PUB. POL‘Y REV. 7, 8 (2003). 
 35 See Krista Hessler Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics 
Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 735 (2010). 
 36 See Biologics, Biosimilars, and Generics: Anticipating the Biosimilar Challenge, 
ANALYSIS GROUP, http://www.analysisgroup.com/anticipating_biosimilar_challenge.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2011). 
 37  See Crimm, supra note 32, at 1019–20; Henry Grabowski, Health Reform and 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1221, 1234–35 (1994)  
 38 See Grabowski, supra note 34, at 1234–35. 
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advent of more sophisticated screening methods, however, at least 
this part of the pharmaceutical research and development (―R&D‖) 
process has possibly become less time-consuming.
39
 
From this initial screening stage, the compounds enter into the 
clinical trials phase of the development process, a step required to 
demonstrate the kind of safety and efficacy necessary to gain 
regulatory approval from the FDA.
40
  The three clinical trials 
phases move the compounds from animal and laboratory testing to 
actual human testing, an extremely delicate undertaking.
41
  As the 
public has become increasingly concerned about potential abuses, 
the FDA has exponentially increased the number of safeguards that 
must be in place while testing on humans.
42
  Implementing these 
safeguards is expensive and time-consuming, as is locating 
adequate numbers of human volunteers to participate in the 
testing.
43
  Trials often necessitate an enrollment of several 
thousand patients, all of whom require careful monitoring and 
other procedures to ensure their safety and the efficacy of the 
trial.
44
  Current estimates suggest that clinical testing of new drugs 
requires anywhere from two to ten years, with an average of about 
five to six years in duration.
45
  Since 1980, the average number of 
clinical trials conducted prior to filing for approval from the FDA 
has more than doubled, and the number of patients in clinical trials 
has tripled.
46
 
 
 39 See Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing 
Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
173, 189–92 (2001). 
 40 Id. at 181 n.27. 
 41 Id. at 181. 
 42 See Crimm, supra note 32, at 1020–26; see also Running Clinical Trials, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/default.htm 
(last updated Sept. 14, 2011).  
 43 See Crimm, supra note 32, at 1024. 
 44 See id.; Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug 
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 156 (2003). 
 45 See Rai, supra note 39, at 181 n.29. 
 46 See OLIVER GASSMANN ET AL., LEADING PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: TRENDS 
AND DRIVERS FOR GROWTH IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 64 (2d ed. 2008); see also 
Gregory J. Glover, Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am., Statement Before the Federal 
Trade Commission and the Department of Justice–Antitrust Division: Competition in the 
Pharmaceutical Marketplace, 4 (Mar. 19, 2002). 
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Moreover, unlike the initial screening process, clinical testing 
costs have risen sharply because now more drugs are being studied 
to treat chronic diseases, which greatly multiplies the complexity 
of the trials and the difficulty of recruiting subjects.
47
  Clinical 
testing further narrows the field of potentially usable candidate 
drugs (chemical compounds); usually all but one or two are 
eliminated.
48
  The remaining compounds are then submitted to the 
FDA for approval via a New Drug Application (―NDA‖).49  The 
FDA‘s approval process can run from months to years depending 
on the drug, but during the period from 1993-2003, the FDA 
approval process had a median length of approximately 15 
months.
50
  The FDA has made a concerted effort to improve the 
efficiency and speed of the approval process, but public pressure to 
ensure that only safe and effective drugs are approved limits how 
quickly the FDA can review NDAs.
51
 
All told, the average time needed from the initial synthesis and 
screening process through to FDA approval has increased 
significantly over the years, rising from 8.1 years in 1960, to 11.6 
years in the 1970s, to 14.2 years in the 1980s and 1990s.
52
  
Similarly, the average cost to develop a new drug is estimated to 
run from $802 million to $1.2 billion and rising, as the clinical 
trials necessary for FDA approval have increased in size and 
duration while the percentage of candidate drugs that pass testing 
has decreased.
53
  In the last three decades or so, the overall cost of 
developing new pharmaceuticals has increased greatly, with no 
 
 47 See Dickson & Gagnon, supra note 31, at 417–18. 
 48 See GASSMANN ET AL., supra note 46, at 11; Grabowski, supra note 3, at 1234–35. 
 49 Crimm, supra note 32, at 1025. 
 50 Fast Track, Accelerated Approval and Priority Review: Accelerating Availability of 
New Drugs for Patients with Serious Diseases, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/ 
byaudience/forpatientadvocates/speedingaccesstoimportantnewtherapies/ucm128291.htm 
(last updated May 28, 2010).  
 51 See id.; New Drug Development and Review Process, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ 
Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssistance/ucm053131.htm (last 
updated Nov. 1, 2011). 
 52 Dickson & Gagnon, supra note 31, at 418; Glover, supra note 46, at 3–4. 
 53 See DiMasi et al., supra note 44, at 180–81; Efthimios Parasidis, Patients over 
Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure in the Regulation of Medical Products, 2011 
WIS. L. REV. 929, 995 (2011) (and sources cited therein). 
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obvious slow-down expected in the near future.
54
  As a result, 
R&D costs alone are outstripping returns.  Even before the Hatch-
Waxman Act, the typical pharmaceutical innovator earned returns 
only 2%-3% over competitive returns.
55
  Given that 
pharmaceutical R&D spending is tightly correlated with the 
expected returns on those investments,
56
 there is cause to worry 
that both long-term R&D spending and pharmaceutical innovation 
may decrease in turn. 
To make matters worse, a fact not mentioned by most 
commentators is that the cost of marketing new pharmaceuticals 
does not stop there.  First, even after a new pharmaceutical has 
been approved for marketing, the FDA often requires that the 
manufacturer continue monitoring its use for additional 
information about its safety, efficacy, or optimal use.
57
  These 
―post-marketing commitment‖ or ―Phase IV‖ studies often cost a 
brand-name pharmaceutical company another twenty to thirty 
million dollars.
58
  Second, and closely related to the first, new 
pharmaceuticals frequently require large marketing and education 
investments in order to introduce physicians, hospital formularies, 
pharmacies, and insurers to the new drug and to educate them 
about the drug‘s benefits and risks, how to use it safely, what new 
information has been gathered about the drug, and so on.
59
  
Without investments in thus ―detailing‖ a new drug to physicians 
and others, the sales of the drug would likely languish for many 
years.  This would further impair the manufacturer‘s ability to 
 
 54 See DiMasi et al., supra note 44, 180–82. 
 55 See F.M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 105 (1993). 
 56 DiMasi et al., supra note 44, at 182–83. 
 57 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 345, 376 (2007). 
 58 See Charles Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration‟s Use of Postmarketing 
(Phase IV) Study Requirements: Exception to the Rule? 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 295, 370 
(2006). 
 59 See Richard E. Caves et al., Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S. 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 1991 BROOKINGS PAPERS on ECON. ACTIVITY 
MICROECONOMICS 1, 3, 11–12 (1991); see also Competition and Regulation Issues in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, OECD at 30 (2000), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/35/1920 
540.pdf (estimating that the U.S. pharmaceutical industry spends at least $5 billion per 
year on promotions). 
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recoup its investment in the drug.  Indeed, pharmaceutical sales 
representatives are usually the first to provide physicians with new 
information about a drug and are often important in keeping 
physicians current about the latest developments in medical 
diagnosis and treatment.
60
  Such promotion investments thus create 
significant positive externalities well beyond any increase in sales 
they might garner.
61
  Despite popular perception, moreover, such 
social welfare-creating, product-specific educational expenditures 
constitute the vast majority of overall pharmaceutical promotion 
spending, as compared to direct-to-consumer advertising or 
advertising to promote general goodwill toward the pharmaceutical 
manufacturer.
62
 
Finally, a third and rapidly growing cost of pharmaceutical 
innovation is product liability.  In recent years, the number of 
lawsuits against pharmaceutical companies alleging product 
liability has outpaced those of just about any other industry, as 
have the average damages awards in these cases.
63
  Most of these 
cases involve allegations of failure to warn of the possible adverse 
effects of the drugs, including effects of unapproved, ―off-label‖ 
uses.
64
  In all, these combined post-marketing costs also add to the 
costs of developing new pharmaceuticals. 
How does brand-name pharma fund the incredibly expensive 
and time-consuming drug development and marketing processes?  
Although the full explanation is somewhat more complicated, for 
private brand-name pharma the answer is mostly patents.  A patent 
is an intellectual property right to exclude all others from making, 
 
 60 See Susan Heilbronner Fisher, The Economic Wisdom of Regulating Pharmaceutical 
“Freebies‖, 1991 DUKE L.J. 206, 219 (1991). 
 61 See id. at 219 (citing Marilyn Y. Peay & Edmund R. Peay, Differences Among 
Practitioners in Patterns of Preference for Information Sources in the Adoption of New 
Drugs, 18 SOC. SCI. MED. 1019 (1984)). 
 62 Id. at 209–10. 
 63 See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: COSTS, 
RISKS AND REWARDS, OTA-H-522 169–82 (1993), available at 
http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/9336.pdf; Joseph Mercola, The Avalanche of 
Pharmaceutical Lawsuits, MERCOLA.COM (Sept. 5, 2006), http://articles.mercola.com/ 
sites/articles/archive/2006/09/05/the-avalanche-of-pharmaceutical-lawsuits.aspx. 
 64 See James O‘Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of Bounds? Prescriber and 
Marketer Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS HEALTH 
L. 295, 315 (2003). 
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selling, using, or offering to sell one‘s patented invention for a 
period of twenty years from the date of filing for the patent.
65
  
Thus, on its face, patents seem like the ideal way for brand-name 
pharma to protect its investment in inventing new drugs, and in 
many ways they are.  The patent system is designed to incentivize 
investments in R&D of new technologies—investments which are 
certainly pivotal to pharmaceutical innovation.
66
  This kind of 
protection can therefore be particularly important for socially 
useful inventions such as pharmaceuticals, which are expensive to 
develop but quite inexpensive to copy.
67
  Indeed, a number of 
studies have produced robust data suggesting that pharmaceuticals, 
above all other areas of science and technology, value their 
patents.
68
  This is thought to be attributable in large part to the fact 
that the traditional small-molecule drug is a single chemical entity 
that, unlike electronics, can usually be covered by a single patent 
(although patents for methods of producing or using the drug or on 
variations of the drug are also possible).
69
  Marketing of a small-
molecule drug therefore does not require the kind of coordination 
of multiple patents and multiple patent holders often seen in other 
industries.
70
  By using a patent to exclude all others from making, 
using, or selling a new drug while garnering all the returns on that 
drug to oneself, a brand-name pharmaceutical innovator could 
recoup enough profit to cover its huge R&D outlays. 
The value of pharmaceutical patents, however, is complicated 
by the fact that new pharmaceutical compounds must go through 
so many years of testing while the terms of their patents tick away.  
Pharmaceutical companies customarily apply for ―composition of 
 
 65 35 U.S.C. §154 (2006). 
 66 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 1, 4. 
 67 See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 88–89 (2008). 
 68 See Derzko, supra note 11, at 251 n.446 (citing Edwin Mansfield, Patents and 
Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGT. SCI. 173 (1986); Ronald C. Levin et al., 
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 796 (1987)). 
 69 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting Functional Balance of Patents and 
Drug Regulation, HEALTH AFFAIRS, 119, 119–20 (2001); Valerie Junod, Drug Marketing 
Exclusivity Under United States and European Union Law, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 479, 
486 (2004). 
 70 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 67, at 106-07; Glover, supra note 46, at 8. 
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matter‖ patents, the strongest type of protection for new chemical 
entities, soon after the initial non-clinical screening process, 
shortly before clinical testing in humans.
71
  This means that the 
maximum twenty-year patent term is ticking away while the drug 
goes through the clinical testing and FDA approval processes and 
the patent application goes through the patent examination 
process.
72
  Thus, by the time a pharmaceutical patent holder can 
actually begin marketing a new drug to begin earning returns on it, 
the patent on the new drug often has only a few years of duration 
left.
73
  Moreover, sales of a new drug after FDA approval will 
often lag as the manufacturer educates health-care providers and 
the public about it.
74
  This is especially true if a new drug is the 
first in its therapeutic or even chemical category.
75
  Most drugs do 
not start to earn positive marginal returns until about the sixth year 
on the market, which leaves even fewer years of patent exclusivity 
to capture meaningful returns that can compensate for the fixed 
overall costs of bringing the new drug to market.
76
 
Furthermore, simply owning a patent on a new drug is no 
guarantee of meaningful market exclusivity.
77
  Many drugs enter 
therapeutic markets already crowded with non-infringing 
 
 71 See Glover, supra note 46, at 3–5; Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-
Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
187, 192 (1999).  
 72 See id. at 192. 
 73 See Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 348; Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, Longer 
Patents for Increased Generic Competition in the US: The Waxman-Hatch Act after One 
Decade, 10 PHARMACOECONOMICS 110, 119 (1996) [hereinafter Grabowski & Vernon, 
Longer Patents]. 
 74 See Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 1, 6 (typically, pharmaceutical firms will aim 
their marketing efforts at physicians who then prescribe the firm‘s drugs to their patients). 
 75 See Ernst R. Berndt, The United States‟ Experience with Direct-to-Consumer 
Advertising of Prescription Drugs: What Have We Learned?, in PHARMACEUTICAL 
INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 174, 175 (Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey Hsieh eds., 2007); William S. 
Comanor, The Economics of Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
in PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, AND COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE supra, at 54, 59. 
 76 Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in Pharmaceuticals, 
19 INT‘L J. TECH. MGMT. 98, 101 (2000) [hereinafter Grabowski & Vernon, Effective 
Patent Life]. 
 77 Cf. Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 32 (2006) (noting 
that patents do not guarantee market power); Glover, supra note 46, at 6–7. 
MORRIS.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2012  5:02 PM 
2012] GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL COMPETITION 259 
alternatives, including alternatives very similar in effect and 
composition to the new drug.  And if the market is not crowded at 
entry, it soon will be, as competitors develop their own non-
infringing ―me-too‖ versions of the new drug.78  Yet other drugs 
treat patient bases that are not nearly large enough to yield returns 
adequate to compensate for their R&D costs.
79
  In fact, only 30% 
of marketed drugs ever earn enough profit to cover their average 
development costs.
80
  With increasing development time and costs, 
in the future even fewer new drugs will be able cover their 
development costs.  As a result, brand-name pharma is forced to 
rely upon the few blockbuster drugs that do earn significant returns 
in order to subsidize the development and marketing of the other 
drugs they develop, many of which bring great social welfare but 
little profit.
81
  Accordingly, even large and highly diversified 
brand-name companies must develop a flagship drug every two to 
three years or risk huge losses.
82
 
Not surprisingly, the pharmaceutical patents on the few 
superstar flagship drugs are extremely valuable, for they are the 
few mainstays that support the rest of the industry‘s activities.  
Brand-name manufacturers therefore routinely introduce new 
dosage formulations or other incremental and sequential 
innovations on these blockbuster drugs in order to continue 
profiting on them.
83
  While brand-name pharma defends this 
practice as enhancing patient outcomes, fostering competition 
within the marketplace, and generally expanding patient and 
physician choices, critics of this practice claim that brand-name 
pharma is merely trying to ―evergreen‖ its original patents on the 
 
 78 See Grabowski & Vernon, Effective Patent Life, supra note 76, at 102; Glover, 
supra note 46, at 6–7. 
 79 See Glover, supra note 46, at 4–7. 
 80 Christopher Fasel, Patent Term Limits, Anti-Trust Law, and the Hatch-Waxman Act: 
Why Defense of a Legally Granted Patent Monopoly Does Not Violate Anti-Trust Laws, 
17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 109, 124 (2007) (citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride 
Anti-Trust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
 81 Grabowski & Vernon, Effective Patent Life, supra note 76, at 102; Glover, supra 
note 46, at 4. The Orphan Drug Act and other types of targeted market exclusivities also 
provide limited incentives to develop beneficial but less profitable pharmaceuticals. See 
Derzko, supra note 11, at 263–64. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 7–8. 
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new drug and thereby unfairly extend its profits.
84
  There is plenty 
of reason to doubt that such sequential innovation patents are 
nearly as suspect as the critics would make out, particularly in light 
of the economic realities outlined above.  Both Congress and the 
courts have grown increasingly skeptical of such strategies, 
however, further limiting the profitability of pharmaceutical 
innovation.
85
 
II. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT 
Into this morass of regulatory and economic pressures steps the 
Hatch-Waxman Act with its byzantine statutory scheme and 
affiliated amendments.  Some of its provisions favor brand-name 
pharmaceutical innovators, largely by restoring part of any patent 
term lost during the development and regulatory approval 
process.
86
  A much more significant effect of the Act, however, is 
fostering generic pharmaceutical entry into the market with their 
typically much lower-price imitations of brand-name 
pharmaceuticals.
87
 
To compensate for some of the patent life lost during the FDA 
approval process, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides for restoration 
of patent term equal to one-half of the time period from the start of 
human clinical trials to NDA approval and all of the time spent 
during the NDA approval process itself.
88
  A patented New 
Chemical Entity (―NCE‖) can receive up to five years of term 
restoration, so long as the total remaining patent life after 
extensions does not exceed fourteen years from the date of FDA 
marketing approval.
89
  Moreover, any single NCE can enjoy only 
 
 84 See id. at 7–8; Junod, supra note 69, at 495; John R. Thomas, Patent 
“Evergreening”: Issues in Innovation and Competition, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 1 (Nov. 
13, 2009), http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/crs/R40917_091113.pdf. 
 85 See id. at 6–7; Derzko, supra note 11, at 220–21. 
 86 See Frank R. Lichtenberg & Tomas J. Philipson, The Dual Effects of Intellectual 
Property Regulations: Within- and Between-Patent Competition in the U.S. 
Pharmaceuticals Industry, 45 J.L. & ECON. 643, 647 (2002). 
 87 Sarah E. Eurek, Hatch-Waxman Reform and Accelerated Market Entry of Generic 
Drugs: Is Faster Necessarily Better?, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, at *2 (2003).  
 88 JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 17 (2005). 
 89 Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006)).  
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one such patent term restoration, even if it is covered by multiple 
patents.
90
  The average effective patent life in other sciences and 
technologies is about seventeen years, after taking into account the 
average three-year interval the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office requires to examine and approve a patent application.
91
  
Hatch-Waxman‘s partial restoration of a pharmaceutical patent‘s 
lost duration therefore helps to restore pharmaceutical patents to at 
least part of the average duration of other types of patents. 
In addition, the Act grants NCEs five years of data 
exclusivity.
92
  This means that for five years after NCE approval, 
generic manufacturers or competitors seeking approval of their 
own pharmaceuticals may not rely on any clinical trial testing or 
other data generated by the NCE manufacturer.
93
  Given that the 
FDA requires extensive clinical testing and other data as proof of a 
drug‘s safety and efficacy, even if that drug is simply an imitation 
of another, approved drug, this five years of data exclusivity 
effectively means that an approved NCE enjoys a minimum of five 
years of market exclusivity, at least for the particular drug at 
issue.
94
  This NCE data exclusivity applies, moreover, even if the 
NCE is not patentable or otherwise granted exclusivity.
95
  As 
mentioned above, however, this does not mean that any given NCE 
will not still face significant competition from other drugs, 
particularly those within the same therapeutic category, that have 
also been approved for marketing by the FDA.
96
  Nonetheless, 
 
 90 Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 91 Indeed, before June 1, 1995, U.S. patent terms were set at seventeen years from date 
of issuance, rather than the current twenty years from date of application. The average 
effective patent term was therefore expected not to change. 
 92 See Kuhlik, supra note 17, at 98. 
 93 See id.  
 94 See id. at 98–99 (explaining how a generic competitor is prevented from filing an 
ANDA until five years after FDA approval of the brand name drug).  
 95 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2006); see also Small Business Assistance: 
Frequently Asked Questions for New Drug Product Exclusivity, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssistance/ucm0
69962.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2011); Kurt R. Karst, The Scope of New Chemical Entity 
Exclusivity and FDA‟s “Umbrella” Exclusivity Policy, FDA LAW BLOG (Jul. 20, 2011, 
8:34 PM), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2011/07/the-scope-
of-new-chemical-entity-exclusivity-and-fdas-umbrella-exclusivity-policy.html.    
 96 See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
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NCE exclusivity does at least mean that for a short period of time, 
others cannot imitate a brand-name innovator‘s new drug or free-
ride on the clinical trials data on that drug.
97
 
Other than patent term restoration and NCE data exclusivity, 
however, brand-name pharmaceutical innovators received few 
other concessions under Hatch-Waxman, a marked contrast to the 
benefits generic pharmaceutical manufacturers received.  To foster 
greater generic entry into the pharmaceutical market, the Hatch-
Waxman Act changed a variety of things.  First and foremost, the 
Act changed the rule that in seeking marketing approval for their 
imitations of brand-name drugs, generic manufacturers could not 
rely on safety and efficacy data generated by the brand-name 
manufacturers.
98
  Prior to the Act, generic manufacturers had to 
generate their own safety and efficacy data for submission to the 
FDA, an often expensive and time-consuming proposition for the 
generic manufacturer that could delay or even deter its entry into 
the market.
99
  Since enactment of the Act, however, a generic 
manufacturer can now file what is known as an Abbreviated New 
Drug Application, or ANDA.
100
  ANDA applicants are not 
required to repeat the expensive and lengthy clinical trials 
previously demanded by the FDA, but instead may simply show 
that its product has the same active ingredient, route of 
administration, dosage form, strength, and labeling as the brand-
name NCE that it imitates.
101
  In stark contrast to the overall 
development cost of bringing an NDA on a new drug through FDA 
approval, the cost of preparing and filing an ANDA is only about 
$1 million.
102
 
Moreover, a generic manufacturer may now begin studying and 
experimenting with an NCE, in preparation for filing an ANDA on 
 
 97 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2006); FDA, supra note 91. 
 98 See 21 U.S.C § 355(j) (2006); Susan Kopp Keyack, The Drug Price Competition 
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Is It A Healthy Long Term Solution?, 21 
RUTGERS L.J. 147, 155 n.60 (1989). 
 99 See 21 U.S.C § 355(j) (2006); Keyack, supra note 98, at 155 n.60. 
 100 See 21 U.S.C § 355(j) (2006). 
 101 See id. 
 102 C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug 
Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 613, 618 (2011) (and sources cited therein). 
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it, even before any patent on the NCE has expired.
103
  This further 
speeds generic entry into the pharmaceutical market.  Pre-Hatch-
Waxman, generics had to wait until all patents expired on an NCE 
before beginning to generate the safety and efficacy data needed to 
file an NDA on its generic imitation of that NCE, which often 
delayed market entry until years after patent expiration.
104
  Post-
Hatch-Waxman, by contrast, generics can now file ANDAs not 
only well before patent expiration, but also forgo the time-
consuming process of generating its own data.
105
  Indeed, under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic can file an ANDA as soon as four 
years after the original approval of the NCE the generic plans to 
imitate.
106
 
As noted above, however, pharmaceutical patents are the bread 
and butter of brand-name pharma, and, even under Hatch-
Waxman, generic manufacturers cannot simply sidestep patent 
rights altogether.  Instead, Hatch-Waxman provides that generics 
filing ANDAs must certify whether the NCE drug they wish to 
imitate is: (i) not covered by any product patent listed by the 
original NCE applicant; (ii) that any such listed patents have 
expired; (iii) that any such listed patents, although still in force 
now, will expire by the time the generic plans to enter the market; 
or (iv) that any such listed patents on the NCE are invalid, not 
infringed by the generic, or both.
107
  These options, designated as 
Paragraph I, II, III, or IV certifications respectively, give both the 
FDA and any potential patent holders notice of the generic‘s 
intent.
108
 
Paragraph IV certifications pose the most interesting problem.  
For a Paragraph I or II certification, the FDA may simply approve 
an ANDA as soon as it is satisfied that the product is safe and 
effective.
109
  Likewise, for a Paragraph III certification, the FDA 
 
 103 See Thomas Chen, Authorized Generics: A Prescription for Hatch-Waxman Reform, 
93 VA. L. REV. 459, 464 (2007). 
 104 See id. at 463. 
 105 Id. at 464; Grabowski & Kyle, supra note 19 at 491–92. 
 106 Id. at 492 (the period shrinks from five to four years when the applicant files a 
Paragraph IV certification). 
 107 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2006). 
 108 See id.; see also Mossinghoff, supra note 71, at 189–90. 
 109 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B) (2006). 
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may simply grant approval as soon as any relevant patent 
expires.
110
  Paragraph IV certifications, on the other hand, establish 
that the FDA cannot approve the ANDAs at issue until all possible 
patent infringement or invalidity issues have been addressed in one 
form or another—a task that the FDA is unable to perform itself.111  
The Hatch-Waxman Act therefore establishes that simply filing an 
ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification is an ―artificial‖ act of 
infringement giving rise to a justiciable case or controversy, 
including a claim for declaratory judgment, under the Patent 
Act.
112
  This in turn gives the federal courts jurisdiction to address 
any conflicts over the relevant patents.
113
 
Although most of the particulars of the consequent resolution 
process are more complex than need be discussed here, one 
additional detail demonstrates just how unique the pharmaceutical 
patents have become after the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted.  
Lest the returns on the generic sales alone are not enough to induce 
a generic manufacturer to challenge an unexpired pharmaceutical 
patent, Hatch-Waxman provides that the first generic to file a 
Paragraph IV certification with regard to any given NCE may 
enjoy 180 days of market exclusivity as the only generic 
manufacturer of that particular drug.
114
  In other words, during the 
180-day exclusivity period, the generic challenger and the brand-
name manufacturer of the NCE enjoy an effective duopoly with its 
potential for supracompetitive returns (although now, simultaneous 
Paragraph IV certifications may mean that multiple generics will 
have to share the 180-day exclusivity).
115
  The 180-day exclusivity 
period commences either on the date the generic first begins 
commercial marketing or on the date a court decides that the patent 
is in fact invalid or not infringed.
116
 
 
 110 See id.  
 111 See William E. Ridgway, Realizing Two-Tiered Innovation Policy Through Drug 
Regulation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1227 (2006). 
 112 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5) (2006); Engelberg, supra note 12, at 401–02.  See also 
generally 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006). 
 113 See Engelberg, supra note 12, at 402.  
 114 See id. at 391. 
 115 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006); Kuhlik, supra note 17, at 97. 
 116 See 21 U.S.C. § 335(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006).  The Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 established some rather complicated 
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In terms of increasing generic entry, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
seems to be a huge success.  Since the law‘s passage, the generic 
industry‘s share of the prescription drug market has jumped from 
just under twenty percent to just under fifty percent.
117
  Likewise, 
the number of generic drugs available jumped from just thirty-six 
percent of the top-selling brand-name drugs to virtually one 
hundred percent coverage of all such drugs.
118
  Before the 
enactment, generics had to spend at least three to five years after 
expiration of the brand-name manufacturer‘s patent to complete all 
the regulatory approval requirements necessary to market a generic 
imitation; today, generic entry occurs immediately upon patent 
expiration, if not sooner.
119
  Finally, and most importantly, generic 
entry has dramatically reduced the price of the affected drugs 
anywhere from forty to seventy percent of their brand-name 
prices.
120
 
Interestingly, defenders of the Hatch-Waxman Act seldom 
mention that at just about the same time as the enactment of the 
Act, both insurers and state laws also changed from discouraging 
or outright prohibiting generic substitution for prescriptions of 
brand-name drugs to encouraging or outright requiring such 
substitution.
121
  Insurers, hospitals, and the government also use 
pharmaceutical benefit managers, or ―PBMs,‖ to manage how 
pharmaceuticals are dispensed and to encourage whenever possible 
generic substitution for prescriptions of brand-name drugs,
122
 even 
 
provisions forfeiting the 180-day exclusivity if not commenced in a timely manner, but 
the effects of those amendments are yet to be seen. See C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate 
Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 
109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 659 (2009). 
 117 See Wansheng Jerry Liu, Balancing Accessibility and Sustainability: How to 
Achieve the Dual Objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act While Resolving Antitrust Issues 
in Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement Cases, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 441, 456 (2008). 
 118 See David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks, 55 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321, 325 (2000).  
 119 See Glover, supra note 46, at 7; Liu, supra note 117, at 456. 
 120 See Scherer, supra note 51, at 101. 
 121 See Caves et al., supra note 59, at 6 (and sources cited therein); Kuhlik, supra note 
17, at 95; see also David Reiffen & Michael S. Ward, “Branded Generics” as a Strategy 
to Limit Cannibalization of Pharmaceutical Markets, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 
251, 255–56 (2007) (attributing this in part to growth of HMOs). 
 122 See Grabowski, supra note 26, at 156; Kuhlik, supra note 17, at 95–96. 
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if doing so means switching to an entirely different drug within the 
same therapeutic class.
123
  In fact, both PBMs and pharmacies have 
their own self-interests at heart when they do so: pharmacies are 
commonly offered higher dispensing fees for selling generics than 
for selling brand-name equivalents.
124
  Nevertheless, these latter 
changes probably account for only a portion of generic penetration 
into the pharmaceutical market.  By all standards, the Hatch-
Waxman Act appears to have achieved that part of its purpose 
well.  But just how well has the Act simultaneously protected 
pharmaceutical innovation? 
III. PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION UNDER THE HATCH-WAXMAN 
ACT 
Although the Hatch-Waxman Act was designed to balance 
brand-name pharma‘s incentives to continue developing new drugs 
with generic pharma‘s ability to enter the pharmaceutical market 
with low-price imitations of those drugs, we can already begin to 
see that the Act has failed to strike the right balance.  As the 
discussion below demonstrates, the Act at the very least has failed 
to protect brand-name pharma‘s patent rights adequately and, 
indeed, likely weakens them even further.  In addition, and perhaps 
more importantly, the Act focuses on what are likely the wrong 
factors—competition and the role of patents.  As a result, the Act 
likely does more harm than good for pharmaceutical consumers in 
the long run. 
First, although the Hatch-Waxman Act was designed in part to 
protect incentives to invest in pharmaceutical innovation and the 
development of new drugs,
125
 it appears to fail in that aim on at 
least three counts.  On the first count, the Act fails to return 
pharmaceutical patents to the same status as other types of patents 
in terms of effective patent life.  As explained above, the average 
 
 123 Lee G. Branstetter et al., Regulation and Welfare: Evidence from Paragraph IV 
Generic Entry in the Pharmaceutical Industry (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 17188, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17188. 
 124 See Caves et al., supra note 59, at 6; Grabowski, supra note 28, at 156; Kuhlik, 
supra note 17, at 95–96. 
 125 See Engelberg, supra note 12, at 389.  
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effective lifespan—the span of time during which the patented 
invention can actually be exploited commercially—is around 
eighteen and a half years for non-pharmaceutical patents,
126
 and is 
potentially even longer if the patent holder decides to market the 
invention before the patent on it has been granted, which patent 
holders often do.
127
  For pharmaceutical patents, by contrast, 
including even those that enjoy patent term restoration under 
Hatch-Waxman, the maximum effective lifespan is only fourteen 
years from the date the FDA approves the drug for marketing;
128
 
no commercial exploitation of the drug may take place before that 
time.
129
 
This raises the second count on which Hatch-Waxman fails.  
Not only does it fail to restore the pharmaceutical patent term to 
the same duration as that for other types of patents, it also fails to 
restore the pharmaceutical patent term to that necessary to recoup 
the costs of developing patentable new drugs in the first place.  As 
noted above, new drugs generally earn negative cumulative cash 
flow until at least the sixth year of marketing because of the huge 
launch expenditures in educating physicians, pharmacies, third-
party payors, and patients about the new drug and the inevitable 
delays in learning about the new drug and how best to use it.
130
  
Even after new drugs begin to earn a positive net return, 
economists have established that the new drugs do not typically 
accumulate enough of those positive returns to recoup their fixed 
costs for R&D and clinical testing until at least the sixteenth year 
of marketing.
131
  This estimate is based on the fixed costs for 
producing drugs (approximately $202 million) as they existed back 
in 1980.
132
  As mentioned above, however, the fixed costs of 
 
 126 See Daniel I. Gorlin, Staving off Death: A Case Study of the Pharmaceutical 
Industry‟s Strategies to Protect Blockbuster Franchises, 63 FOOD DRUG L.J. 823, 832 
(2008); Kuhlik, supra note 17, at 96–97. 
 127 See Frequently Asked Questions About Patents, USPTO, www.uspto.gov/faq/ 
patents.jsp (last updated Mar. 30, 2011, 4:26:58 PM) (describing use of the term ―patent 
pending‖ on products).  
 128 Mossinghoff, supra note 71, at 190. 
 129 Development & Approval Process (Drugs), FDA, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/ 
developmentapprovalprocess/default.htm (last updated Oct. 27, 2009). 
 130 Grabowski & Vernon, Effective Patent Life, supra note 76, at 100. 
 131 Id. at 100–01. 
 132 Id. 
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developing new drugs, particularly the cost of clinical trials, have 
been increasing at a rapid rate, such that independent estimates of 
current fixed development costs now approach anywhere from 
$802 million to $1.2 billion.
133
  With the significant generic market 
entry that has occurred since the 1980s, thanks in large part to the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, as well as the various laws and policies now 
requiring generic substitution for prescriptions of brand-name 
drugs, the average effective patent life necessary for new drugs to 
recoup their fixed costs is likely far greater than the earlier 
estimate of sixteen years. 
Thus, if the patents were truly to operate in compensating 
brand-name pharmaceutical innovators for the costs of developing 
new drugs, and thereby incentivize them to develop new drugs, 
effective pharmaceutical patent life would have to extend for at 
least sixteen years, if not more.  In fact, at least one (admittedly 
stylized) analysis has suggested that, when measured in terms of 
not only brand-name pharmaceutical operating costs but also the 
overall social welfare that they create, the optimal effective patent 
life might be closer to eighteen or even nineteen years.
134
  By 
capping maximum patent term extensions to five years extension 
and only fourteen years total duration, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
clearly falls short of the mark. 
Indeed, the Hatch-Waxman Act not only fails to extend 
effective pharmaceutical patent exclusivity to the duration 
necessary but also may fail to extend it at all. Consider the average 
effective patent exclusivity pre-Hatch-Waxman.  Average 
pharmaceutical patent life just prior to the Act was only about 
eight years.
135
  As noted above, however, prior to the Act, generics 
manufacturers could not enter the market directly upon patent 
expiration.
136
  Instead, they had to wait until after patent expiration 
to perform their own time-consuming safety and efficacy studies, 
rather than simply free-riding on the data in the brand-name 
 
 133 Carver et al., supra note 35, at 735; Kuhlik, supra note 17, at 94. 
 134 Hughes et al., supra note 28, at 30–31. 
 135 Grabowski & Vernon, Longer Patent Life, supra note 73, at 118; Grabowski & 
Vernon, Effective Patent Life, supra note 76, at 103. 
 136 See supra text accompanying notes 103–05; see also Branstetter supra note 123, at 
3; Eisenberg supra note 57, at 356–57; Gongola supra note 22, at 791–92. 
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manufacturer‘s previously filed NDA.137  This process typically 
took another three to four years beyond patent expiration, thereby 
granting brand-name manufacturers a de facto three- to four-year 
extension on their patent exclusivity.
138
  Now compare this to 
pharmaceutical patent exclusivity after Hatch-Waxman.  Despite 
the Act‘s patent term extension provisions, most pharmaceutical 
patents still enjoy an average effective lifespan of only eleven to 
twelve years at best,
139
 with patent-term extensions of only two to 
three years on average.
140
  Moreover, studies suggest that average 
effective patent life is declining even further over time, due in part 
to the growing length of clinical testing.
141
  In other words, any 
patent-term extensions that brand-name manufacturers might enjoy 
under Hatch-Waxman are generally offset by the Act‘s 
experimental-use exception and ANDA provisions,
142
 and are 
being even further eroded by the increasing complexity of clinical 
trials. 
Finally, addressing the third count, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
makes matters worse and in effect further reduces expected 
pharmaceutical patent life by changing the calculus for generics 
that want to challenge a pharmaceutical patent as potentially 
invalid.  In effect, the Hatch-Waxman Act actually makes 
pharmaceutical patents weaker than any other type of patent by 
making challenges to pharmaceutical patents easier and more 
attractive than for any other type of patent.  To understand how 
this works, one needs to understand that, as with all types of 
patents, even the best pharmaceutical patent is not iron-clad.
143
  
When pharmaceutical companies apply to the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO) for patent protection on their newly 
 
 137 Id. 
 138 Henry Grabowski, Are the Economics of Pharmaceutical Research and 
Development Changing? Productivity, Patents and Political Pressures, 22 
PHARMACOECONOMICS 15, 19 (2004); Grabowski & Kyle supra note 105, at 492. 
 139 Kuhlik, supra note 17, at 96–97. 
 140 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC 
DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY xiv 
(1998); Grabowski & Vernon, Longer Patent Life, supra note 73, at 121. 
 141 Hughes et al., supra note 28, at 5 (and sources cited therein). 
 142 Engelberg supra note 12, at 392. 
 143 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 330–31, 331 
n.21 (1971) (explaining the importance of litigating patent validity). 
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developed drugs, the PTO does its best to assure that the drug 
meets all the various requirements for patentability.  For all its 
efforts, however, the PTO often misjudges or outright misses 
evidence that a particular drug is not in fact eligible for patent 
protection.
144
  Thus, under the Supreme Court‘s precedent in 
Blonder-Tongue, no pharmaceutical or other type of patent is ever 
declared definitively valid, for a court must constantly evaluate 
whether the patent before it is one that the PTO should not have 
granted.
145
  Given the uncertainty of the patentability requirements 
and the possibility that the PTO missed some relevant evidence of 
unpatentability, this means that many if not most patents are 
subject to at least colorable arguments that they are in fact invalid.  
Add to this the uncertainty of litigation and the vagaries of trial, 
and some of these colorable arguments may persuade a court that 
the patent at issue is invalid and should never have been granted in 
the first place.  Moreover, under Blonder-Tongue, a patent is 
subject to such challenges throughout its lifetime, and if you 
subject the same patent to multiple challenges by multiple 
challengers, one of those challenges will likely succeed, if only by 
the weight of the odds.
146
 
The Hatch-Waxman Act exacerbates this effect with regard to 
pharmaceutical patents by further reducing the costs of such 
opportunistic challenges and indeed rewarding them.  For non-
pharmaceutical patents, the probability of invalidation is a concern 
that is at least partially mitigated by the fact that patent litigation is 
a costly process, particularly for the losing party.
147
  This 
discourages many of the more spurious challenges and even some 
 
 144 As seen by the large number of patents that get invalidated through litigation. 
 145 Blonder-Tongue Labs, 402 U.S. at 330–31, 331 n.21. 
 146 For this very reason, patent rights have often been described as ―contingent property 
right[s],‖ or ―probabilistic property right[s],‖ Jay P. Kesan & Marc Banik, Patents as 
Incomplete Contracts: Aligning Incentives for R&D Investment with Incentives to 
Disclose Prior Art, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 23, 25 (2000); Mark A. Lemley & Carl 
Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 75, 76 (2005). 
 147 See, e.g., Jean Olson Lanjouw & Mark A. Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent 
Litigation: A Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129, 132 (2000) (finding that 
because, inter alia, the probability of trial declines in the cost of trial relative to the cost 
of settlement, pharmaceutical patents are more likely to be litigated than other types of 
patents). 
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of the legitimate ones.
148
  The Hatch-Waxman Act changes the 
calculus for generic manufacturers, however, in two significant 
ways. 
First, as detailed above, the Act creates an artificial act of 
infringement when a challenger simply files a Paragraph IV 
certification with the FDA, asserting that the pharmaceutical patent 
at issue is invalid, not infringed, or both.
149
  Ordinarily, to create a 
justiciable case of infringement of non-pharmaceutical patents, an 
alleged infringer must invest in actually infringing a patent, 
thereby risking not only that investment but also liability for 
damages caused thereby.
150
  By contrast, generic challengers to 
pharmaceutical patents under the Hatch-Waxman Act risk neither, 
making such challenges almost risk-free, save for the cost of 
litigation.  The result is a sort of Russian roulette for the brand-
name patent holder because generic challengers, one after the 
other, can continue to challenge the patent at almost no cost to 
themselves until one of them hits the jackpot and convinces a court 
to invalidate the patent.
151
 
Second, successful generic first challengers also enjoy the 
prospect of 180 days of exclusivity profits, a bonus supposedly 
implemented on the notion that generic manufacturers would not 
invest their litigation dollars in invalidating a patent if other 
generic manufacturers would later be able to free-ride on that 
investment.
152
  The profits from 180 days of exclusivity can be 
quite substantial, however, and may likely more than compensate 
 
 148 See id.  
 149 See supra text accompanying notes 107 09. 
 150 Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust 
Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 523 (2007). 
 151 See id. at 524 25; see also C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical 
Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1606–07 
(2006) (adverting to ―probabilistic‖ nature of patent validity as inducement to file 
Paragraph IV challenges). 
 152 See Erika King Lietzan, A Brief History of 180-Day Exclusivity Under the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 59 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 287, 288 (2004); CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, Guidance for Industry: 
180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity Under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, FDA, at 3 (1998), 
www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances/ucm079342.pdf. 
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for litigation costs.
153
  Indeed, in a duopolistic market, with just the 
brand-name innovator and the single generic challenger, both may 
be able to maintain a market price of as much as 94% of the 
original brand-name market price. 
154
  This represents a loss for the 
brand-name innovator, who still has to recoup its sizable R&D 
outlay, but a great windfall for the generic challenger, who has 
spent next to nothing in invalidating the patent.  Moreover, given 
the low costs of challenging a patent and the high potential 
windfall from doing so, the more profitable the patented drug, the 
more likely a generic is to challenge the patent, even if the odds of 
succeeding in the challenge are low.
155
  The current trend is 
therefore for generic manufacturers to challenge an entire array of 
brand-name drug patents in hopes that they will win the jackpot on 
at least one of those challenges.
156
 
The profits from the 180-day exclusivity decrease, of course, if 
more than one generic Paragraph IV filer is awarded the 
exclusivity, but even so remain quite high and, in any event, often 
well above their shared litigation costs.
157
  The lure of profits from 
the 180-day exclusivity period also remains quite substantial even 
if the brand-name innovator introduces its own lower-priced 
―authorized generic‖ version in order to gain a share of the generic 
market.
158
  It is thus clear that generic manufacturers who 
 
 153 Hemphill, supra note 151, at 1579–80. 
 154 Id. at 504 05. 
 155 Hemphill, supra note 151, at 1579–80. 
 156 Grabowski, supra note 138, at 20. 
 157 See Grabowski & Vernon, Longer Patent Life, supra note 73, at 116 (finding 
average generic price mark-ups to be 89%, compared to average brand-name markups of 
30%, one year after generic entry); see also Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 102, at 618 
(referring to Paragraph IV litigation costs of approximately $10 million); David Reiffen 
& Michael R. Ward, Generic Drug Industry Dynamics, 87 REV. ECON. STAT. 37, 44, 48 
(2005) (noting that generic profits can remain well above competitive levels when only 2 
to 4 competitors enter market).  
 158 See Ernst R. Berndt et al., Authorized Generic Drugs, Price Competition, and 
Consumers‟ Welfare, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 790, 794 (2007) (noting that Paragraph IV 
filings do not decrease and may even increase as result of authorized generic 
introduction); FTC, Authorized Generics: An Interim Report of the Federal 
TradeCommission 85–92 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/08/20 
11genericdrugreport.pdf (noting that authorized generics have not deterred Paragraph IV 
challenges); see also John R. Thomas, Authorized Generic Pharmaceuticals: Effects on 
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challenge pharmaceutical patents enjoy significant advantages that 
challengers to other types of patents never enjoy, making even 
relatively strong pharmaceutical patents more vulnerable to 
challenges than patents in any other industry or market.  This is 
particularly true for flagship drug patents, which by virtue of 
earning the highest returns are also the most attractive targets for 
generic challenge.
159
  Attacking flagship drug patents particularly 
damages the brand-name pharmaceutical innovators, however, for 
those are exactly the drugs that subsidize not only their own 
development costs but also the costs of other beneficial but less 
profitable drugs.
160
  By weakening drug patents and lowering their 
overall expected value, then, the Hatch-Waxman Act lowers the 
expected returns on, and the incentives for investment in, the kind 
of pharmaceutical innovation that leads to such patents. 
Indeed, Hatch-Waxman‘s effect on pharmaceutical patents has 
been measurable.  At least one study suggests that Paragraph IV 
challenges by generic manufacturers shorten effective patent lives 
by at least 1.5 years, and that this holds true regardless of whether 
the challenges were successful.
161
  Of course, critics argue that the 
Paragraph IV certification provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
benefit consumers by allowing generic manufacturers to weed out 
―bad‖ patents, by which they apparently mean patents that provide 
undue exclusivity.
162
  In particular, critics point to so-called 
―evergreening,‖ or sequential, patents that brand-name 
manufacturers allegedly use to prolong their drugs‘ patent terms.163  
Unlike active ingredient patents on an NCE itself—usually the first 
patent filed, before clinical testing even begins—sequential patents 
 
Innovation, CRS Report for Congress, at 9 (August 8, 2006) (citing case where generic 
profits remained in hundreds of millions of dollars even after authorized generic entry). 
 159 See Hemphill, supra note 111, at 635; Thomas, supra note 158, at 18. 
 160 Krishan Maggon, R&D Paradigm Shift and Billion-Dollar Biologics, in HANDBOOK 
OF PHARMACEUTICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 163 (Shayne C. Gad ed., 2007); Glover, supra 
note 42, at 4. 
 161 Grabowski & Kyle, supra note 105, at 501. 
 162 E.g., Michael Kades, Whistling Past the Graveyard: The Problem with Per Se 
Legality Treatment of Pay-for-Delay Settlements, 5 COMPETITION POLICY INT‘L 143, 147 
(2009). 
 163 See, e.g., Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 102, at 619. See generally Michael A. 
Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing Dimension 
of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009 (2009). 
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typically cover variations on delivering those active ingredients, 
such as different doses, different formulations, metabolites, or new 
uses of existing drugs.
164
  As such, sequential patents tend to be 
filed, and to expire, later than any patent on a drug‘s active 
ingredient.
165
  Critics therefore accuse brand-name pharma of 
using sequential patents to extend the nominal, although not 
necessarily effective, patent life on the underlying active 
ingredient.
166
 
As it happens, sequential patents are also those that are most 
often challenged, and most often successfully challenged, under 
Hatch-Waxman‘s Paragraph IV provisions.167  Sequential patents 
rose starkly in number after Hatch-Waxman was enacted.
168
  
Although many question these patents as merely strategic, they can 
also be seen as way of incentivizing investments in new indications 
and formulations, particularly after Hatch-Waxman opened the 
floodgates of generic market entrants.
169
  Sequential patents do 
tend to be ―weaker,‖ however, and are therefore more likely to 
draw Paragraph IV challenges.
170
  Active ingredient patents on the 
NCE itself are generally the strongest because they cover drugs 
never known before and therefore unlikely to have been 
anticipated by others.
171
  Active-ingredient patents are also the 
broadest in scope, excluding all others from making any 
reformulation of a drug containing that active ingredient.
172
  
Sequential patents, by contrast, tend to be narrower in scope, 
covering only the particular reformulation claimed, and also 
weaker, in that the reformulations are more likely to be held 
invalid for anticipation or obviousness.
173
  Because generic 
 
 164 Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 354; Hemphill & Sampat supra note 102, at 619–20, 
623. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 102, at 643 (noting that effective patent lives are 
often shorter than nominal patent lives). 
 167 Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 354; Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 102, at 629, 644. 
 168 Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 102,  at 619–20. 
 169 Grabowski, supra note 138, at 20; Mossinghoff, supra note 71, at 191. 
 170 Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 102, at 619. 
 171 Id. at 619–20, 623. 
 172 Grabowski & Vernon, Longer Patents, supra note 73, at 119; Hemphill & Sampat, 
supra note 102, at 619–20, 623. 
 173 Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 102, at 619–20, 623. 
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manufacturers can enjoy the 180-day exclusivity period regardless 
of which patent they challenge, they will often single out 
sequential patents for challenge even though they are limited to the 
particular reformulations claimed, if successful.
174
 
If, however, sequential patents arose largely in response to 
Hatch-Waxman in an effort to fend off the increased generic 
market incursion under the Act,
175
 Hatch-Waxman‘s Paragraph IV 
certifications are being used largely just to challenge patents that 
would likely never have existed but-for Hatch-Waxman.  Given the 
litigation costs of such challenges, the potential windfalls they 
create for generics, and the lower net revenue they create for 
brand-name pharma, this effective circularity would appear to be 
little more than an inefficient redistribution of wealth from brand-
name pharma to generic pharma.
176
 
Another of the unintended consequences of the Paragraph IV 
provisions, moreover, has been a flood of allegations that brand-
name and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers are manipulating 
the legal system to achieve anti-competitive ends through so-called 
―reverse-payment settlements‖ of patent litigation.177  Given the 
high stakes and uncertainty of trial, patent holders—the brand-
name drug manufacturers—often settle with generic challengers by 
giving them cash, patent licenses, or other consideration, thereby 
―reversing‖ the expected flow of settlement payments.178  Because 
the direction of these transfers is admittedly unusual, it has 
prompted intense scrutiny.  In particular, the Federal Trade 
Commission and others have argued that the only possible 
explanation for these unique settlements is that they thwart efforts 
to invalidate ―bad‖ pharmaceutical patents and effectively pay 
 
 174 Id. at 622–23. 
 175 Id. at 615–16. 
 176 Cf. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006) (citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 
261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (―Hatch-Waxman essentially redistributes the 
relative risk assessments and explains the flow of settlement funds and their 
magnitude.‖). 
 177 See Holman, supra note 139, at 530 33. 
 178 Id. at 494. (―The ‗reverse‘ designation refers to the direction of the payment from 
the patentee to alleged infringer; in most patent litigation settlements, any payment will 
typically flow from the alleged infringer to the patentee.‖) 
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generics to delay entry into the market for the patented drug.
179
  
Under this logic, such settlements are inherently suspect or even 
per se illegal under Section One of the Sherman Act and harm the 
public by maintaining higher drug prices.
180
  Courts thus far have 
rejected complaints that these settlements are antitrust violations, 
holding instead that the agreements are within the ―exclusionary 
zone‖ of patent protection and thus exempt from antitrust 
analysis.
181
  But just the fact that brand-name pharmaceutical 
patent holders have to deal with such an enhanced level of 
challenges to their patents and, indeed, have to deal with further 
challenges as to how they settled the original challenges, is yet 
another huge cost to the industry that creates even more 
uncertainty as to the value of investments in pharmaceutical R&D. 
IV. THE MYTH OF GENERIC COMPETITION UNDER THE HATCH-
WAXMAN ACT 
The ultimate irony of the Hatch-Waxman Act is that, in the 
end, the high cost of brand-name pharmaceutical innovations and 
the prices that consumers pay for that innovation really have 
nothing to do with either patent protection or even lack of 
competition within the pharmaceutical marketplace.  The myth 
underlying the Hatch-Waxman Act is that the lower prices at 
which generic manufacturers can offer their drugs must mean that 
generic manufacturers are horizontal competitors to brand-name 
pharma.
182
  In other words, but for generic market entry, brand 
 
 179 Id. at 533 34. 
 180 Id.  Section One of the Sherman Act, which defines and prohibits anticompetitive 
conduct, provides that ―[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is declared to be illegal . . . .‖ In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 
906 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004)). 
 181 On the debate regarding reverse payment settlements, see generally Hemphill, supra 
note 111; see also David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment 
Settlements in Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303, 1308–09 (2010); 
David Balto, Removing Obstacles to Generic Drug Competition, A Critical Priority for 
Health Care Reform, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS at 1 (2009), www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/2009/06/pdf/generic_drugs.pdf.  
 182 See Liu, supra note 112, at 484; Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, 
The Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 590 
(2003) (noting Congress‘ goal to increase generic competition). 
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names would have no price-lowering competition, and therefore 
the Hatch-Waxman Act must introduce such competition by 
introducing greater generic presence within the pharmaceutical 
marketplace and by restraining the effect of patents on such 
competition.
183
  This myth is based on several different fallacies, 
including the idea that pharmaceuticals could ever be a competitive 
market, at least not without significant changes far beyond those 
contemplated by the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
As an initial matter, it is important to appreciate that the 
pharmaceutical market is not a competitive one for a number of 
reasons beyond the regulatory burdens manufacturers might face, 
the presence or absence of generic manufacturers, and even the 
presence or absence of patent protection.
184
  True, the 
pharmaceutical market is burdened with stringent regulatory 
requirements and with relatively strong patent protection, both of 
which serve as obstacles to entry into this market,
185
 although not 
as much as one might think.  First, as mentioned above, patents 
often pose little obstacle to competition, particularly from 
meaningful substitutes for the patented good or process.
186
  This is 
as true for pharmaceutical goods as it is for any other patented 
good; a drug often experiences significant competition from 
similar drugs or drugs that treat the same condition.
187
  Second, 
while regulatory requirements can discourage market entrants, they 
are hardly an absolute barrier unless specifically designed to be so, 
like those under the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Before the Act was put 
in place, the FDA did not actively keep others from entering a 
market to compete with a drug already approved for marketing; all 
a would-be competitor would have to do is meet the regulatory 
requirements itself and thereby secure its own FDA approval to 
 
 183 See Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 184, at 590 (discussing historical background 
and purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
 184 See Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 5. 
 185 See Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 121. 
 186 See Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 9. 
 187 Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, FTC, Address Before the 7th Annual Competition in 
Health Care Forum: Everything Old Is New Again: Health Care and Competition in the 
21st Century (Nov. 7, 2002), in 2002 WL 31504162, at 6 n.47; see Glover, supra note 42, 
at 6–7. 
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market a competing drug.
188
  This is exactly what many 
competitors did before the Act and what they continue to do even 
after the Act.  Indeed, even now that the Act is in place, 
competitors who have themselves obtained FDA approval may 
enter a market to compete with an approved drug, as long as the 
competitors‘ drugs are not identical or near identical copies of an 
approved drug that enjoys NCE or other types of marketing 
exclusivity.
189
 
Nevertheless, even if the pharmaceutical industry possessed no 
patents and faced no regulatory requirements, the market for 
pharmaceuticals would still not be a competitive one.  For one 
thing, private insurers and other third-party payors not only 
interrupt the chain between patient consumers and pharmaceutical 
manufacturers but also skew the demand for those 
pharmaceuticals.
190
  The entire third-party payor system means that 
consumption of pharmaceuticals does not always reflect their 
social benefit, particularly where the consumer does not bear costs 
in proportion with the overall cost of the drugs consumed.
191
  A 
2000 report revealed that 69.3% of all prescription drug costs were 
paid not through patient consumers but through third-party payors, 
with 13% of that paid by state-run Medicaid programs.
192
  Insured 
patients and patients covered by government programs therefore 
are more often than not completely unaware of the true price of 
their prescriptions, such that their demand rarely reflects either 
supply or price.
193
  Indeed, for a number of reasons, consumer 
 
 188 See Liu, supra note 112, at 455–56. 
 189 See Kuhlik, supra note 17, at 103–04. 
 190 See Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 3. 
 191 See id. 
 192 See Grabowski, supra note 26, at 156. 
 193 See Sarah Fisher Ellison, et al., Characteristics of Demand for Pharmaceutical 
Products: An Examination of Four Cephalosporins, 28 RAND J. ECON. 426, 427 (1997) 
(noting that physicians, from whom consumers get their information, have limited 
knowledge regarding relative drug prices); Matthew J. Seamon, Antitrust and the 
Biopharmaceutical Industry: Lessons from Hatch-Waxman and an Early Evaluation of 
the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 34 NOVA L. REV. 629, 638–
40 (2010) (explaining the inelastic nature of pharmaceutical drugs). But see OLIVER 
GASSMANN ET AL., LEADING PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION TRENDS AND DRIVERS FOR 
GROWTH IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 25 (2d ed. 2008) (noting that consumers are 
starting to become more aware of drug prices). 
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demand for pharmaceuticals is relatively inelastic.  Patients lack 
the kind of information necessary to make consumption decisions 
based on price, quality, or other values, for these decisions are 
typically made for them by their physicians, hospitals, and 
insurers.
194
  Moreover, as the ultimate payors for pharmaceuticals, 
both the government and private insurers can often exert great 
bargaining power in negotiating price with brand-name as well as 
generic pharmaceutical manufacturers, again skewing 
pharmaceutical prices away from what they might have been in a 
freely competitive market.
195
 
It is therefore a good thing that the pharmaceutical industry is 
as heavily regulated as it is and that it can rely on patent protection 
as much as it does—otherwise, the industry might not have 
survived, and undoubtedly would not operate to the optimal level 
of benefit to society.
196
  In fact, for years the government has 
effectively subsidized various aspects of the pharmaceutical 
industry through federal tax deductions and credits for R&D 
expenditures,
197
 federal grants supporting upstream research, and 
regulatory exclusivities such as the Orphan Drug Act.
198
  Indeed, 
society would not necessarily want the pharmaceutical industry, or 
any other health care industry, to act too much like a freely 
competitive market, for that might lead to tragic choices in terms 
of who receives such benefits and who does not.
199
 
Given the largely non-competitive nature of the pharmaceutical 
and health care markets more generally, it is somewhat puzzling 
that the Hatch-Waxman Act should focus so entirely on generic 
 
 194 See Caves, supra note 59, at 5–6; Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 3, 5. 
 195 See GASSMANN ET AL., supra note 193, at 25–26 (commenting on bargaining power 
of HMOs and even government entities). 
 196 See Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pharmaceutical Sector in Health Care, in 
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 25, 29–30 (Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey Hsieh eds., 
2007); Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 151, at 586.   
 197 See Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation 
in International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL‘Y. L. & ETHICS 193, 
221 (2005).  See generally Crimm, supra note 32; DiMasi et al., supra note 53. 
 198 See Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: The State of 
Play, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 505, 523 n.97 (2005). 
 199 See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 247, 318–
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market entry and removing barriers to that entry as a way of 
creating a more competitive marketplace.  True, generic 
manufacturers can offer pharmaceuticals at lower prices than 
brand-name manufacturers and often are prevented from doing so 
by patent protection of various brand-name drugs.
200
  But this is a 
far cry from saying that patents and other barriers to generic 
market entry are what truly cause the differential in brand-name 
and generic pricing—i.e., but for the lack of competition between 
these two sectors of the pharmaceutical industry, consumers would 
enjoy lower drug prices.  Rather, closer examination reveals a 
whole raft of other reasons why generics can price so much lower 
than brand-names, and all those reasons have to do with the fact 
that generic manufacturers, by their nature, free-ride on brand-
name manufacturers‘ investments in pharmaceutical innovation. 
First, the Hatch-Waxman Act assumes that brand-name 
pharmaceuticals charge supra-competitive prices because, and only 
because, they lack competition within the marketplace, either by 
virtue of patent protection or by virtue of the simple absence of 
generic competition.
201
  Economists have shown, however, that 
brand-name pharmaceutical pricing, even without patent 
protection, is not based on competition from generics, but rather on 
competition from alternatives within the same therapeutic class,
202
 
not to mention the need to recoup R&D and other costs.
203
  Indeed, 
even after generic entry, brand-name pharmaceuticals do not lower 
their costs to those of the generic, but rather maintain relatively 
higher prices despite the loss in sales.
204
 
Second, the myth of generic competition underlying the Hatch-
Waxman Act relies on the fallacy that generics can provide 
meaningful competition for brand-name pharmaceuticals in 
anything other than price.
205
  To appreciate the fallacy of this 
reasoning, one need only look at the patent system and its 
 
 200 See Melissa K. Davis, Note and Comment, Monopolistic Tendencies of Brand-Name 
Drug Companies in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 15 J.L. & COM. 357, 357 (1995). 
 201 See Liu, supra note 112, at 443.  
 202 See id. at 480; Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 9. 
 203 See Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 9; see also Liu, supra note 112, at 488.  
 204 Saha et al., supra note 25, at 28.   
 205 See Liu, supra note 112, at 484–85.  
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underlying policies.  Patents are commonly conceived of as 
―embarrassments‖ to antitrust law in that they insulate the patentee 
from free market competition.
206
  This is true, but only to the 
extent that they protect patentees from competition as to price, for 
patents are designed to do far more than protect against mere price 
competition.  Rather, patents are designed to incentivize innovation 
by protecting investments in innovation from those who would 
seek not to compete with the innovation, but rather simply to free-
ride on it.
207
  Patents thus protect innovation, which is not 
something generic manufacturers provide, just as they do not 
provide education, safety and efficacy data, or many other social 
benefits that brand-name pharmaceuticals provide.
208
 
Indeed, the fact that generic pharmaceutical manufacturers 
provide so little other than mere manufacturing and distribution is 
exactly what separates them from brand-name manufacturers, and 
what leads to the steep differential in their respective market 
pricing. Consider first each sector‘s respective R&D investments.  
R&D is a valuable output, without which no new drugs would be 
identified.  Brand-name innovators invest in and produce a great 
deal of R&D, but generics obviously produce none.
209
  The same 
can be said of clinical trials data on the safety and efficacy of new 
drugs.  If it were not for the fact that brand-name innovators invest 
the millions of dollars necessary to produce safety and efficacy 
studies, the burden would be shifted onto patients and health care 
providers, who would then have to make their own investments in 
determining which drugs on the market are safe and effective and 
which are not.  Generic manufacturers used to have to produce this 
service as a pre-requisite to FDA marketing approval, but the 
Hatch-Waxman Act quite sensibly recognized this investment as 
duplicative and wasteful, given that generics produce no new drugs 
 
 206 See T. Randolph Beard, et. al., Quantifying the Cost of Substandard Patents: Some 
Preliminary Evidence, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 240, 243–244 (2010). 
 207 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (―Congress shall have the power . . . to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.‖). See also 
Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 21, at 9. 
 208 See Liu, supra note 112, at 484–85. 
 209 See id. 
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that brand-name innovators have not already tested.
210
  Generics 
therefore may now free-ride not only on the brand-name 
innovators‘ R&D investments, but also on their safety and efficacy 
studies.
211
 
Similarly, generics can free-ride on brand-name innovators‘ 
investments in so-called ―detailing,‖ which are the large marketing 
and education outlays that the innovators generally must invest in 
whenever they market a new drug.
212
  Brand-name innovators 
typically concentrate these investments within the first two years 
after market launch of the new drug, although they will often 
continue up to generic market entry.
213
  Generic manufacturers, by 
contrast, typically invest nothing in product-specific detailing, 
relying instead on overall firm marketing.
214
  And although critics 
of brand-name pharma, as well as the public, are generally 
skeptical of such expenditures as nothing but naked rent-seeking, 
detailing actually does provide a significant social benefit in terms 
of introducing new drugs to those who need to understand them, 
such as physicians, hospitals, and even patients.
215
  Again, 
although these detailing investments obviously serve the self 
interests of brand-name manufacturers, these outlays in distributing 
information also save consumers and health-care providers from 
having to make as great an investment on their own in identifying 
and understanding which new drugs are on the market.
216
  Indeed, 
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Waxman Act:  Lower Prices Now In Exchange for Less Pharmaceutical Innovation 
Later?, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 829, 834–35 (2003). 
 211 See id.  Generic manufacturers do have to provide data that their generic equivalents 
have the same active ingredient, route of administration, dosage form, strength, and 
labeling as the brand-name drugs that they imitate. Id. 
 212 Pharmaceutical Detailing, SEARCHHEALTHIT, http://searchhealthit.techtarget.com/ 
definition/detailing (last updated Feb. 2011). 
 213 See Comanor, supra note 71, at 59. 
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manufacturer-provided detailing may be a much more effective 
and cost-efficient way than physician research in providing 
important information to both health-care providers and 
consumers.
217
 
Last, but not least, generic manufacturers do not face the same 
risks that brand-name innovators do.  For one thing, generic 
manufacturers are much more able to hedge against the risk of 
negative profit margins, for they quite consciously choose to 
imitate only those brand-name drugs that are profitable.
218
  Brand-
name manufacturers, on the other hand, may not necessarily know 
ex ante which drugs will be profitable at the very early point in 
time of deciding whether to invest in the R&D to develop such a 
drug.  The majority of drugs turn out to be economically 
unprofitable, even if socially quite beneficial, and so brand-name 
innovators are forced to rely on their few flagship drugs to 
subsidize the rest.
219
  Again, only 30% of marketed drugs earn 
enough profit to cover their own development costs, and even 
fewer earn enough to cover the costs of other, less profitable 
drugs.
220
  Generic manufacturers therefore can generate much 
more pure profit from those drugs that they do decide to market. 
For another thing, generic manufacturers may face less risk 
than brand-name manufacturers in terms of product liability and 
may even be able to shift some of that liability onto brand-names.  
Courts have repeatedly held that generic manufacturers are 
effectively exempt from failure-to-warn liability suits under federal 
law.
221
  Under federal law, manufacturers must generally mark 
generic versions of a drug with labels that are identical to the FDA-
approved labels attached to the brand-name version.
222
  They are 
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therefore often exempt from liability for failure to warn under 
federal law.
223
  A recent Supreme Court case has effectively 
extended this exemption by holding that federal law preempts any 
state law claims of liability as well.
224
  By contrast, the California 
Court of Appeals recently ruled that, because a generic label must 
be identical to the brand-name label, a brand-name drug 
manufacturer may be liable for a generic manufacturer‘s failure to 
warn.
225
 
Moreover, although brand-name innovators rely heavily on 
patent protection to fend off generic imitators and other free-riders, 
patents are actually rather poor tools for the job.  The patentability 
of new drugs depends solely on their ability to meet requirements 
such as novelty, non-obviousness, and utility
226
 but has little to do 
with their development costs, profitability and, perhaps most 
notably, their social value.
227
  Innovators hope that patents will 
nonetheless help them recoup their costs and generate a little 
profit, but the patent system can offer no guarantees.  Instead, the 
patent system relies on the market to incentivize and reward 
investments in innovation, but as discussed above, the market is an 
unreliable means of incentivizing pharmaceutical innovation and 
other health care goods and services.
228
  Indeed, some propose that 
industry regulators simply acknowledge this fact and offer to 
strengthen the pharmaceutical patent of a manufacturer‘s choice if 
it produces low-profit drugs and vaccines.
229
  Yet others suggest 
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PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
MORRIS.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2012  5:02 PM 
2012] GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL COMPETITION 285 
that longer regulatory exclusivities might be better suited to 
assuring some reasonable return on pharmaceutical innovation.
230
  
The Hatch-Waxman Act and other statutory provisions do offer 
pharmaceutical innovators such exclusivities, but one has to 
wonder whether they are currently adequate to protect incentives to 
invest in such innovation.
231
 
In sum, it is difficult to conceive of generic manufacturers as 
representing competition for brand-name pharmaceutical 
manufacturers in any real sense.  Generics do not increase 
efficiency or offer greater consumer choice but rather market at 
lower prices simply because they copy from and free-ride on 
brand-name manufacturers.  Given this reality, one has to question 
whether the Hatch-Waxman Act‘s focus on generics as supposed 
competition is a mistake.  Indeed, one must question whether any 
effort to inject competition into the pharmaceutical market is truly 
the most effective way of reducing consumer costs.  In balancing 
static efficiency (lower costs now) with dynamic efficiency 
(continued innovation and perhaps lower costs later), the law must 
be careful to foster only as much competition as is consistent with 
overarching regulatory goals.
232
  Over-privileging the value of 
competition in the pharmaceutical market may ultimately 
discourage continued innovation by brand-name pharmaceuticals. 
CONCLUSION 
Without a doubt, health care costs are on the rise, and how to 
reduce those costs is of great concern to many.
233
  In response to 
these concerns, the Hatch-Waxman Act sought to reduce one 
aspect of health care costs, the price of pharmaceuticals, by 
encouraging generic pharmaceutical manufacturers to enter the 
market as price competition to brand-name pharmaceutical 
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manufacturers.
234
  The Hatch-Waxman Act has undoubtedly 
contributed to the much greater generic entry now seen in the 
pharmaceutical market, but the Act seems to have neglected some 
important considerations.  Brand-name manufacturers set higher 
prices for their pharmaceutical goods for a reason.  Brand-name 
pharma is the industry sector that invests hundreds of millions of 
dollars annually in not only researching and identifying new drug 
candidates but also in exhaustively testing those candidates for 
safety and efficacy before releasing them to the public.
235
  Generic 
manufacturers, on the other hand, produce none of these and other 
incredibly important but incredibly expensive outputs and 
therefore can market drugs at mere production cost.
236
 
Indeed, for a variety of reasons, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
appears to misprize the value and even possibility of ―competition‖ 
within the pharmaceutical market.  As a result, the ultimate effect 
of the Act seems to be a sacrifice of long-term efficiency and 
continued pharmaceutical innovation for the sake of short-term 
price reductions.  Hatch-Waxman seems grossly to have overshot 
the mark in terms of lowering pharmaceutical prices and 
encouraging generic entry.  Perhaps simply streamlining FDA 
approval for generics, providing generics with an experiment-use 
exemption, or both, would have been more than enough to 
facilitate generic market entry without unduly sacrificing brand-
name pharma‘s incentives to continue innovating. This may be 
particularly true now that state laws and private insurers have both 
changed their policies to favor, rather than discriminate against, 
generics.  Whether the Hatch-Waxman Act is a sustainable model 
for the pharmaceutical industry more generally has yet to be seen, 
but the signs so far are not promising.  We may therefore want to 
reconsider the Hatch-Waxman Act in favor of other, more 
balanced approaches to lowering pharmaceutical consumer costs 
that would do more to protect incentives for innovation in the 
industry. 
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